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EMPLOYMENT LAW—WELCOME TO THE JUNGLE 1: SALESPE
OPLE AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXEMPTION TO THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT
INTRODUCTION
The landscape of working life in America has undergone a sea
change since the dawn of our young country.2 As our nation has
industrialized and technology has advanced, so too have employers’
expectations of their workers. However, as job duties evolve, it has
become increasingly difficult to characterize whether a particular
job fits into traditional labor law norms of jobs protected by the
Fair Labor Standards Act.
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act3 (FLSA) in
1938 as New Deal legislation4 with the purpose of “neutraliz[ing]
the ‘twin evils’ of overwork and underpay.”5 Pursuant to such
goals, Congress set limitations on weekly working hours by estab
lishing an overtime pay requirement.6 The FLSA dictates that em
ployers requiring their employees to work in excess of the statutory
maximum must pay an overtime rate “not less than one and onehalf times” the employee’s usual rate of pay.7 Congress, however,
indicated exceptions to the overtime pay requirement for “any em
ployee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or profes
sional capacity.”8
1. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 1 (Doubleday, 1st ed. 1906). Upton Sinclair’s
novel exemplifies the horrific working conditions in America which led to the eventual
passing of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938.
2. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT,
WHITE-COLLAR EXEMPTIONS IN THE MODERN WORK PLACE, GAO/HEHS-99-164, 1
(1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99164.pdf (indicating “the indus
trial profile of the American economy has shifted dramatically”).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
4. Craig A. Cunningham, Note, Mind the Gap: A Legal and Economic Analysis of
Stockbroker Overtime Eligibility Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1243, 1246 (2009); see also Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938:
Maximum Struggle for a Minimum Wage, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 22, 22 (1978).
5. Regan C. Rowan, Comment, Solving the Bluish Collar Problem: An Analysis of
the DOL’s Modernization of the Exemptions to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 119, 119 (2004).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2006).
7. Id.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006). The FLSA indicates exemptions for other cate
gories of workers such as, among others, computer technicians and farm workers. See
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Although the employment landscape in the United States has
changed dramatically, the exemptions to the FLSA’s overtime re
quirements remained largely untouched for over fifty years.9 The
outdated exemptions have been the source of much dispute, re
cently causing the Department of Labor (DOL) to promulgate
amended regulations and issue guidance documents clarifying their
application.10 Unfortunately, attempts to clarify the exemptions
have only confused the issue further.11
Due to the vagueness of the regulations regarding the adminis
trative employee exemption, the circuits have split over whether to
find certain types of employees exempt. In particular, courts have
struggled with how to classify salespeople.12 Courts examining the
exempt status of salespeople have come down on opposite sides,
often in cases involving similar fact patterns.13 Perhaps because a
salesperson’s primary job duties straddle both exempt (marketing)
and not exempt (sales) duties, courts have varied in determining
whether salespeople are entitled to overtime compensation.
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2)-(b)(30). A discussion of exemptions other than the administra
tive exemption is outside the scope of this Note.
9. U.S. GEN ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 3.
10. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1246-48 (referencing the regulations codified at
29 C.F.R. § 541 (2004)). This Note will examine only the administrative exemption.
For an in-depth look at the other exemptions, see Peter M. Panken, The 2004 Revisions
to the Overtime Regulations under the Fair Labor Standards, in 2 AIRLINE AND RAIL
ROAD LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 1027
(2004); Joseph E. Tilson, Jeremy Glenn & Nicholas Strohmayer, Hot Topics in Wage
and Hour Law, in 2 38TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 681 (Practising
Law Institute 2009).
11. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 23. Employers
complained that the duties prong of the test was “confusing and applied in an inconsis
tent manner by the DOL,” while DOL investigators claimed “determinations about
independent judgment and discretion [could] be the most difficult part of a compliance
review.” Employees complained that “classifi[cation] as an exempt [status had] been
increasingly simplified by judicial opinions,” resulting in “few protections remain[ing]”
for particular types of employees.
12. For the purposes of this Note, the terms “salespeople” and “sales personnel”
will refer to employees who are paid on a salary, rather than an hourly basis. Workers
paid on an hourly basis do not fall within the exemptions to the FLSA discussed in this
Note. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006). At the same time, the scope of the term “salespe
ople” will exclude outside sales workers, who are addressed in a separate exemption to
the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
13. See, e.g., In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011); Reiseck v. Universal Commc’n of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d
101 (2d Cir. 2010); Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 2416 (2010). Contra Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280 (3d
Cir. 2010); Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2008); Cash v. Cycle Craft
Co. Inc., 508 F.3d 680 (1st Cir. 2007).
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This Note will examine how the FLSA classifies salespeople,
and will conclude that salespeople should not be classified as ad
ministrative employees exempt from overtime wages pursuant to
the FLSA. Part I will examine the background and history of the
FLSA, including the administrative exemption. Part II will high
light several recent decisions among the various circuits reaching
different conclusions regarding salespeople and the administrative
exemption. Part III will examine the DOL’s interpretation of the
exempt status of salespeople. In Part IV, this Note will argue that
sales personnel in today’s service-based economy mirror the line
workers contemplated by the FLSA in the production-based econ
omy at the time the statute was originally enacted. As such, the
protections within the FLSA for production workers should apply
to sales personnel.
This Note will argue further that the DOL’s position regarding
the classification of salespeople is entitled to deference. In an effort
to clarify their status, the DOL has commented several times re
cently on the application of the administrative exemption to sales
personnel. Specifically, the DOL has interpreted the FLSA to indi
cate that salespeople are entitled to overtime pay.14 Because the
DOL has been charged with the duty of enforcing the FLSA, the
agency is entitled to deference regarding its interpretations of the
statute, both in terms of the recent regulations and the more infor
mal interpretive rules. As an expert in the field, the DOL is in the
best position to speak to the application of the FLSA. Courts
should defer to the DOL’s interpretation of both the FLSA and its
own regulations, as the Second Circuit has rightly done.15 As a gen
eral rule, courts should find that salespeople are not administrative

14. The DOL has indicated that the “‘exemptions to the Act are to be narrowly
construed against the employer[ ].’” See, e.g., Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 7 In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611
F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-0437), 2009 WL 3405861 [hereinafter Amicus Brief];
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO.
2010-1 (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/adminIntrprtn/
FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_1.htm [hereinafter ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO.
2010-1] (both quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)). Addi
tionally, the DOL has deemed the production/administration dichotomy a useful tool in
evaluating the exempt status of sales personnel. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRE
TATION NO. 2010-1, supra. See infra Part III.
15. See, e.g., In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011); Reiseck v. Universal Commc’n of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d
101 (2d Cir. 2010); Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 2416 (2010).
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employees pursuant to the FLSA, and are therefore entitled to
overtime compensation.
Such an application of the FLSA is necessary to promote the
uniformity of its application. A uniform classification of salespe
ople will ensure protection to the greatest number of workers. It
will also promote a just administration of the Act. It would be fun
damentally unfair for similarly situated workers within the same in
dustry to be subjected differently to the Act’s overtime provisions.
At the same time, employers need guidance in classifying workers
in order to avoid the unfair surprise of costly judgments regarding
overtime wages. A uniform standard of classification would pre
vent costly misclassification and prevent some companies from hav
ing an arbitrary economic advantage over their competition
because they were permitted to avoid paying overtime wages.
Deference to the DOL’s limited application of the administra
tive exemption ensures the most protection to the greatest number
of workers. Such a limited application is particularly appropriate in
the current dim economic climate.
I. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
COLLAR” EMPLOYEES

AND

“WHITE

A. History of the Overtime Requirement of the Fair Labor
Standards Act
The current landscape of American employment only mini
mally resembles the setting as it existed a century ago.16 After the
Civil War and subsequent Reconstruction Era, the United States
began a period of industrialization that dramatically altered work
ing conditions.17 Although the Industrial Revolution benefitted the
United States both in terms of economics and lifestyle, working
conditions for the American worker disintegrated.18 This period of
devastating economic and social conflict escalated into the Great
Depression.19 In answer to the economic and social crisis of the
time, Congress and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt enacted
16. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 1 (indicating “the
industrial profile of the American economy has shifted dramatically”).
17. Pamela N. Williams, Historical Overview of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 10
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 657, 658 (2009).
18. Id. Services for Americans improved, such as transportation and improved
food processing, but to the detriment of the conditions of the factories that provided
such conveniences. Id.
19. Id. at 660.
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legislation to address, among other concerns, the existing labor and
employment issues.20
On June 25, 1938, President Roosevelt signed into law the Fair
Labor Standards Act, one of the pillars of Roosevelt’s “New Deal”
legislation.21 The FLSA included in its mission a standard for mini
mum wages and maximum hours for the working American.22 Spe
cifically, the FLSA established criteria to eliminate “labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum stan
dard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-be
ing of workers.”23 Implicitly, the legislation was meant “to ensure
employees a reasonable quality of life outside the workplace.”24 To
this end, the FLSA instituted an overtime pay requirement, man
dating that employers pay “a rate . . . one and one-half times the
[usual] rate” for hours worked in excess of the statutory maximum
weekly hour allowance.25
B. Exemptions to the FLSA Overtime Requirement for
Administrative Employees
The policy goals of the FLSA overtime requirements were
threefold: “a shorter work week, compensation for overworked em
ployees, and work spreading (or ‘work sharing’).”26 The DOL has
referred to the overtime requirements as “‘among the nation’s most
important worker protections.’”27 However, these requirements
were never intended to extend to the more affluent, or white-collar
worker.28 The original form of the FLSA exempted from the Act’s
wage and hour standards those “employee[s] employed in a bona
20. Id.; see also Grossman, supra note 4 (describing how prior to FLSA, President
Roosevelt enacted the National Industrial Recovery Act [NIRA] “‘to raise wages, cre
ate employment, and thus restore business’”). The National Labor Relations Act, or
Wagner Act, “which ‘guaranteed the rights of workers to join labor unions and to bar
gain collectively with their employers’” was also enacted prior to the FLSA. Williams,
supra note 17, at 667.
21. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1245-46.
22. Id.; see also Grossman, supra note 4.
23. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1246 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006)).
24. Id.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1938).
26. Rowan, supra note 5, at 123.
27. Steven I. Locke, The Fair Labor Standards Act Exemptions and the Pharma
ceutical Industry: Are Sales Representatives Entitled to Overtime?, 13 BARRY L. REV. 1,
3 (2009) (quoting Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Defining and Delimiting the
Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer
Employees; Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122-23 (Apr. 23, 2004) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 541) [hereinafter “Final Rule”]).
28. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1246; Rowan, supra note 5, at 124-25.
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fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity.”29 Whitecollar employees did not need the protections of the FLSA, due to
the higher salary, potential for promotion, and greater job security
associated with the typical white-collar position.30 The FLSA
charged the DOL with the duty of establishing the standards for the
white-collar exemptions.31 To that end, the DOL formulated spe
cific regulatory tests to determine which employees fell within the
white-collar exemptions to the Act’s wage and hour requirements.32
Prior to 2004, the DOL regulations indicated an employee
must meet each of the requirements of a three-part test in order to
be considered an exempt white-collar worker.33 Particularly, the
employee first must have been paid on a salary, rather than an
hourly basis (the salary-basis test). The amount of the employee’s
salary must have been sufficient to indicate managerial or profes
sional status (the salary-level test). Finally, the employee’s job du
ties must have involved managerial or professional skills.34 At this
time, the statutory regulatory requirements for white-collar workers
had changed little since 1954, the changes limited mostly to in
creases in the dollar amount within the salary-level test.35
According to the statutory test, an employee who was compen
sated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $250 per
29. 29 U.S.C.§ 213(a)(1) (2006). The specific white-collar exemption relevant to
this Note is the administrative exemption. Although the legislative history of the FLSA
does not indicate an explanation for the exemption, the Minimum Wage Study Com
mission of 1981 asserted the “white collar” exemptions were warranted on the basis of
the managerial and professional nature of these types of jobs. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT
ING OFFICE, supra note 2 at 5.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id. at 3. Prior to the 2004 Amendments, the DOL applied a “long test” to
employees earning less than $250 per week, and a “short test” to employees earning
$250 per week or more. The long and short tests were designed as part of the duties test
with the presumption that an employee’s higher salary level directly correlated to the
type of job duties he performed, thereby reducing the analysis required of the courts in
examining whether the employee’s job duties indicated an exempt status. See U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 7 tbl. 1. For further analysis of the “short
test,” see Rowan, supra note 5, at 128-29 (citing HARRY WEISS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
WAGE & HOUR DIV., REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROPOSED REVISIONS FOR
REGULATIONS, PART 541, at 22 (1949)) (explaining the rationale behind the short tests).
Over time, the “short test” became the test applied most often, as the salary level was
last adjusted in 1975, and was not established to adjust with inflation. As a result, the
majority of workers eventually qualified for the “short test.” Rowan, supra note 5, at
128-29.
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week,36 and “[w]hose primary duty consist[ed] of . . . office or nonmanual work directly related to management policies or general
business operations of the employer . . .; and [w]hich . . . requir[ed]
the exercise of discretion and independent judgment”37 fell within
the boundaries of the administrative exemption. Generally, the re
quirement that exempt employees exercise independent judgment
and discretion indicated that they “ha[d] the freedom to make
choices about matters of significance to their employers, without
immediate supervision or detailed guidelines.”38 Over time, the du
ties prong of the regulation’s requirement for exempt employees
became increasingly more difficult to navigate,39 with employers,
employees, and DOL investigators alike unhappy with its applica
tion.40 Recognizing how outdated the regulations had become, the
DOL looked to amend the regulations.
By the early part of the new millennium, it became increasingly
clear that the FLSA had begun to show its age.41 Employment law
scholars complained “[w]ith the advent of the ‘virtual workplace,’
telecommuting by employees, and flexible scheduling arrange
ments, this depression-era statute is starting to show some signs of
aging, and many . . . have called into question its relevance in the
modern workplace.”42 As the industrial landscape changed, the
specific white-collar exemptions to the overtime requirements be
36. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 7 tbl. 1.
37. Panken, supra note 10, at 1033.
38. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 23.
39. Joseph E. Tilson & Jeremy J. Glenn, New Law, New Cases, and Tough Issues
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, in 33RD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT
LAW 169, 174 (Practising Law Institute 2004).
40. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 23. Employers
complained the duties prong of the test was “confusing and applied in an inconsistent
manner by the DOL;” while DOL investigators claimed “determinations about inde
pendent judgment and discretion [could] be the most difficult part of a compliance re
view.” Id. Employees complained that classification as an exempt status had been
“increasingly simplified by judicial opinions,” resulting in “few protections remaining”
for particular types of employees. Id. at 25; see also Rowan, supra note 5, at 129 (indi
cating the duties test “proved to be particularly cumbersome for employers.”); G.
Thomas Harper, DOL dubs new overtime regulations ‘FairPay Initiative,’ but opponents
cry foul, FLA. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (May 2004), available at http://www.harpergerlach.
com/FELL/FELLMay04.pdf (“The regulations and case law were imprecise, convo
luted, confusing, and often contradictory.”).
41. Tilson & Glenn, supra note 39, at 169; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF
FICE, supra note 2, at 1 (“Critics of the FLSA claim that [the] shift [from a manufactur
ing-based to a service-oriented economy] as well as the increased use of sophisticated
technology, have left the FLSA and its regulations outdated and in need of revision.”).
42. Tilson & Glenn, supra note 39, at 169.
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came more difficult to administer as well.43 At the time the FLSA
was adopted, the economy was primarily agricultural and manufac
turing-based.44 The white-collar exemptions were applicable in the
economic setting of the time. In particular, the boundaries of
white-collar workers’ decision-making responsibilities were clearly
defined, such workers were more likely to be management, and
white-collar workers were better compensated than their modern
day counterparts.45
As the economy moved to a more service-oriented employee
base, the number of American workers qualifying for exemption
under the FLSA wage and hour requirements increased exponen
tially.46 In 1998, for example, the service industries employed 24
million full-time workers, approximately double the number of ser
vice industry workers employed in 1983.47 Nearly one quarter of all
workers in the United States was employed in the service industry
in 1998, making the service industry the largest employment sec
tor.48 Many argued this paradigm shift left the white-collar exemp
tions to the FLSA largely inapplicable to the current workforce.49
The DOL recognized that the exemptions to the FLSA wage
and hour overtime requirements had largely become ineffective.50
On April 23, 2004, the DOL promulgated what it deemed a “Final
Rule” defining and delimiting the exemptions for white-collar em
ployees.51 According to the DOL, the purpose of the new regula
43. Rowan, supra note 5, at 121 (“[T]he DOL’s failure to modernize the tests to
reflect changing labor conditions has muddied the regulatory waters.”); see also Harper,
supra note 40, at 1 (“Over the last decade or two, employers have found it increasingly
difficult to decide which employees are entitled to overtime and which are not.”).
44. Rowan, supra note 5, at 119.
45. Michael A. Faillace, Automatic Exemption of Highly-Paid Employees and
Other Proposed Amendments to the White-Collar Exemptions: Bringing the Fair Labor
Standards Act into the 21st Century, 15 LAB. LAW. 357, 358 (2000) (describing the char
acteristics of white-collar workers at the time the FLSA was adopted).
46. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 8.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., id. at 21 (stating that discussions with employers and politicians
demonstrated that many believed the “traditional limits of the white-collar exemptions
[were] outdated in the modern work place”).
50. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122 (“The . . . overtime pay requirement . . .
protections have been severely eroded . . . because the [DOL] has not updated the
regulations [applicable to white-collar employees].”).
51. Final Rule, supra note 27. The new regulations increased the salary level ap
plicable to administrative employees for the first time since 1975. Id. at 22,166. Setting
the new salary level required to meet exempt status at $455 per week, the DOL be
lieved it had struck a balance between properly defining the limits of the white-collar
employees without improperly disqualifying a large number of employees from exemp
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tions was fourfold. First, revisions to the tests for exempt
employees were needed “to restore the overtime protections in
tended by the FLSA which ha[d] eroded over decades.”52 Second,
the DOL intended the new regulations to reflect both changes in
the workplace and developments in federal case law surrounding
the exemptions to the FLSA since the Act had last been
amended.53 Changes to the confusing and complex regulations
were necessary to prevent unethical employers from using the un
certainty of the regulations to their advantage and refusing to pay
overtime to employees where it was due.54 Additionally, confusing
regulations would have the effect of creating “a trap for the un
wary” employer who honestly could not determine whether to clas
sify certain employees as exempt.55 Finally, the DOL sought to
prevent employees from resorting to expensive and time consuming
litigation to obtain overtime pay that was rightfully theirs.56 In the
Preamble to the new regulations, the DOL indicated it would vio
late its statutory duty to “‘define and delimit’ the section 13(a)(1)
exemptions ‘from time to time’” if it allowed more time to pass
without updating the regulations.57
In addition to adjusting the salary level upwards, the new regu
lations made changes to the much-litigated “duties” test.58 These
changes were merely a watered-down version of those that were
proposed, however.59 While the proposed regulations eliminated
much of the ambiguous language that had been the source of litiga
tion,60 the Final Rule diluted many of these changes, largely in re
sponse to complaints offered during the public comment period.61
However, the final version of the new regulations added a new re
quirement to “‘discretion and independent judgment,’” such that
tion. Id. at 22,171. Although the new regulations did not index the newly amended
salary levels for inflation, partly because the DOL believed the FLSA did not grant it
such authority, the DOL promised to update the salary levels more frequently. Id. at
22,171-72. A discussion of the salary test is not relevant to this Note.
52. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. For a discussion of the changes to the regulations in 2004, see supra notes
50-55 and accompanying text; infra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
57. Id.
58. Adam T. Klein, Mark R. Humowiecki, Tarik F. Ajami & Cara E. Greene, The
DOL’s New FLSA White Collar Exemption Regulations and Working with the DOL on
FLSA Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 466 (2006).
59. Id. at 466; see also Harper, supra note 40.
60. Rowan, supra note 5, at 133.
61. Id.
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the “primary duty must include ‘the exercise of discretion and inde
pendent judgment with respect to matters of significance.’”62 The
2004 Final Rule attempted to clarify the new requirements of the
duties test with reference to case law, stating “the exercise of discre
tion and independent judgment ‘involves the comparison and the
evaluation of possible courses of conduct and acting or making a
decision after the various possibilities have been considered.’ The
term ‘matters of significance’ refers to the level of importance or
consequence of the work performed.”63
While the new rules added the “matters of significance” re
quirement, they elected to retain the production/administration di
chotomy test.64 Specifically, the new rules retained the requirement
that exempt employees perform “office or non-manual work di
rectly related to the management or general business operations of
the employer . . . .”65 In an attempt to clarify which employees
would be considered exempt based on the performance of work,
the new regulations listed examples of exempt work: “tax; finance;
accounting; budgeting; auditing; insurance; quality control; purchas
ing; procurement; advertising; marketing; research; safety and
health; personnel management; human resources; employee bene
fits; labor relations; public relations; government relations; com
puter network, internet and database administration; legal and
regulatory compliance; and similar activities.”66
Notwithstanding the DOL’s attempts to clarify and streamline
the white-collar exemptions,67 response to the new regulations was
not positive.68 Many argued the new regulations did little to effec
tuate the necessary change.69 General agreement could not be
reached regarding which employees would or would not be consid
ered exempt under the new regulations.70 The significant rise in
62. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,139 (emphasis added).
63. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,139 (citing Bothell v. Phrase Metrics, Inc., 299
F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002)).
64. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,139.
65. Id. at 22,137.
66. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201 (2004).
67. Klein, Humowiecki, Ajami & Greene, supra note 58, at 465.
68. See, e.g., Klein, Humowiecki, Ajami & Greene, supra note 58; Harper, supra
note 40.
69. See, e.g., Klein, Humowiecki, Ajami & Greene, supra note 58, at 465 (“While
the DOL initially sought to substantially revise the duties test, the final version largely
mirrors the short test under the old regulations.”); Harper, supra note 40, at 2 (“The
changes made to the exempt duties tests have turned out to be a lot less dramatic than
some of the language that was included in the proposed regulations.”).
70. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1247.
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multibillion dollar class action lawsuits regarding overtime claims in
recent years71 indicates that even under the new regulations, the
exemptions are frequently misunderstood, leading to misclassifica
tion by employers.72
Perhaps the most significant problem with the new regulations
lies in the fact that some employees, particularly salespeople, often
perform job duties that can be construed as both exempt and non
exempt.73 For example, while under the new regulations an em
ployee must have the authority to make an independent decision
without immediate direction or supervision in order to qualify as
exempt,74 the requirement will still be satisfied if there is review of
such decisions by a supervisor.75 In addition, the authority to make
an independent decision will place an employee within the bounda
ries of the exemption even if the authority is limited to making a
recommendation for a particular action rather than taking the ac
tion itself.76 As a result, litigation regarding whether employees
can be considered exempt has increased recently rather than de
creased, resulting in judgments against employers in the hundreds
of millions of dollars.77 With the new regulations, the road was
paved for the DOL to extend overtime benefits to salespeople.
II. CASE LAW REGARDING SALESPEOPLE
ADMINISTRATIVE EXEMPTION

AND THE

Much dissention has arisen among the courts regarding the ex
empt status of salespeople whose job duties place them potentially
71. Tilson & Glenn, supra note 39, at 171; see also infra note 275.
72. Tilson & Glenn, supra note 39, at 174; see also Harper, supra note 40, at 2
(“That increasingly led to misclassification of workers and lawsuits for unpaid
overtime.”).
73. Harper, supra note 40, at 2.
74. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(c) (2004).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 541.207(e) (2004).
76. Id.
77. Tilson, Glenn & Strohmayer, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that in 2008, Walmart
settled cases regarding the administrative exemption to FLSA overtime requirements
for 700 million dollars). See also Frederick C. Leffler et al., Second Circuit Narrowly
Reads FLSA Exemption in Novartis Ruling, PROSKAUER ROSE LLP (July 27, 2010),
http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alert/second-circuit-narrowly-reads-flsa
exemptions-in-novartis-ruling/. In response to the recent Novartis ruling, “businesses
which rely heavily on the . . . administrative exemptions may find themselves targets of
litigation” Id. At the same time, certiorari was recently denied in the Novartis case,
leaving the pharmaceutical sales company with a very large standing judgment to pay its
sales representatives overtime wages. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141
(2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011). See also supra notes 68-69 and
accompanying text.
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both within and outside of the administrative exemption. The fun
damental difficulty in classifying salespeople lies in the ambiguity of
the regulatory tests which reviewing courts have struggled to apply.
The Second Circuit has consistently and correctly held that salespe
ople cannot be considered “administrative employees” and are,
therefore, not exempted from the FLSA overtime requirements.78
Other circuits, however, have inappropriately held the opposite.79
A. Cases Holding Salespeople Not “Administrative Employees”
Under the FLSA
Several recent Second Circuit cases have that held salespeople
are entitled to overtime compensation. These decisions have held
that salespeople are not administrative employees and therefore
not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions. The cases focus
on sales-specific aspects of the salesperson’s duties, although the
employees in question may also have job duties that fall outside of
the realm of exempt job duties.
In Reiseck v. Universal Communications of Miami, Inc., the
Second Circuit ultimately determined Plaintiff Lynore Reiseck did
not fall under the administrative exemption.80 As Regional Direc
tor of Sales, Ms. Reiseck’s job duties involved both direct and indi
rect sales or sales promotion,81 requiring Ms. Reiseck to “generat[e]
advertising sales . . . for Universal’s magazine publication, Elite
Traveler.”82 Ms. Reiseck was paid a base salary with commissions,
but was paid no overtime during her employ.83
In evaluating whether Ms. Reiseck’s job duties as a salesperson
selling advertising space in a magazine qualified her as an adminis
trative employee exempted from overtime wages,84 the Second Cir
cuit referenced the second prong of the regulatory test. The test
78. See, e.g., Novartis, 611 F.3d at 149; Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami,
Inc., 591 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2010); Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529 (2d
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2416 (2010).
79. See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir.
2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 760 (2011); Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280 (3d
Cir. 2010); Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2008); Cash v. Cycle Craft
Co., 508 F.3d 680 (1st Cir. 2007). The cases are largely fact-specific. Indeed, the new
regulations indicate that “there must be a case-by-case assessment to determine
whether the employee’s duties meet the requirement for [the] exemption.” Final Rule,
supra note 27, at 22,144.
80. Reiseck, 591 F.3d at 108.
81. Id. at 103.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 105.
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required that an exempt employee’s duties be “‘directly related to
management policies or general business operations . . . .’”85
The Second Circuit held that because Elite Traveler was dis
tributed without cost, sale of advertising space was the primary
source of revenue for the publication,86 and thus was the defen
dant’s “product.”87 Because the plaintiff’s primary duty was to sell
a product, she did not qualify as an administrative employee under
the FLSA.88 The court adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit
in Martin v. Cooper Electric Supply Co. 89 An employee who makes
specific sales is not an administrative employee for the purposes of
the FLSA, while an employee whose primary job responsibility is to
increase sales among all customers generally falls within the exemp
tion.90 While the plaintiff arguably had job duties generally pro
moting the travel magazine’s business in her position as Regional
Sales Manager, the court looked only to her sales duties in finding
her an employee eligible for overtime compensation under the
FLSA.91
The Second Circuit also addressed the issue of whether sales
people qualify as administrative employees in Davis v. J.P. Morgan
Chase. In Davis, the court held that a class of bank underwriters,
whose primary job duty was to approve (or “sell”) loans pursuant
to detailed bank guidelines, qualified as administrative employees
entitled to overtime pay.92
In performing their required job duties, the plaintiffs consulted
detailed bank guidelines, “the Credit Guide,” to determine whether
loan applicants qualified for a loan.93 The Second Circuit deter
mined that the plaintiffs did not qualify as administrative employ
ees, basing its decision on the section of the regulations that
85. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(a) (2004)).
86. Id. at 106.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 107. The court referenced the regulations definition of “primary duty”
as one “that consumes a ‘major part, or over [fifty] percent, of the employee’s time.’”
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (2004)).
89. Martin v. Cooper Electric Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1991).
90. Reiseck, 591 F.3d at 107 (citing Martin, 940 F.2d at 905).
91. Id. at 108.
92. Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 587 F.3d 529, 530 (2d Cir. 2009).
93. Id. Both the plaintiffs and the bank agreed that underwriters had the power
to deviate from the Credit Guide and independently evaluate the credit worthiness of
loan applicants. However, the parties disagreed over what level of discretion a loan
underwriter had to make exceptions to the Credit Guide. Id. at 531. The court ulti
mately determined this discretion was not enough to bring the plaintiffs within the ad
ministrative exemption. Id. at 537.
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addressed “[t]he production/administration dichotomy.”94 The reg
ulations further defined work that “related to management policies
or general business operations . . . [as] ‘those types of activities re
lating to the administrative operations of a business as distinguished
from ‘production’ or, in a retail or service establishment, ‘sales’
work.’”95
Relying on a recent analysis of the production/administration
dichotomy by the DOL, the court held that the primary job duties
of loan underwriters involved the “production” of loans rather than
the “general business operations” of the bank.96 Furthermore, the
bank itself referred to the work of loan underwriters as “production
work.”97 The court also held that measuring the loan underwriters’
output was another indication that the employees in question were
engaged in production work.98 In short, an underwriter employed
by the defendant was “directly engaged in creating the ‘goods’—
loans and other financial services—produced and sold by Chase.”99
Ultimately, the court concluded that because the plaintiffs’ pri
mary job function was to carry out the production of the bank’s
goods (here, loans), they did not perform work directly related to
management policies or general business operations of the bank.100
As such, the plaintiffs did not fall within the administrative exemp
tion to the FLSA.101
The recent Second Circuit case, In re Novartis Wage and Hour
Litigation,102 dealt with the issue of whether the administrative ex
94. Id. at 532. The court evaluated the exempt status of the underwriters by ap
plying the regulatory test as it existed prior to the 2004 amendments. Id. at 531 n.2. See
infra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
95. Davis, 587 F.3d at 531 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.205(a) (2004)) (emphasis
added).
96. Id. at 534 (citing DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., OPINION LETTER OF
FEB. 16, 2001, 2001 WL 1558764, at *1. Interestingly, the court did not address a 2006
DOL Wage and Hour Division opinion letter published Sept. 8, 2006, which indicated
mortgage loan officers were exempt administrative employees. This opinion letter has
since been withdrawn by the DOL in an Administrative Interpretation published March
24, 2010, subsequent to the date of this opinion. See ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETA
TION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14; see also discussion infra Part III.A.
97. Id. The loan underwriters were not expected to provide customers with ad
vice regarding which loans best suited their needs, but rather, were primarily expected
to adhere to the Credit Guide. Davis, 587 F.3d at 534.
98. Id. Loan underwriters were compensated based on the number of loans they
produced that met the standards outlined in the Credit Guide. Id.
99. Id. at 535.
100. Id. at 537.
101. Id.
102. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011).
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emption to the FLSA applied to salespeople in the context of phar
maceutical sales representatives.103 The plaintiffs, a class of
approximately 2,500 sales representatives, alleged that Novartis, a
drug manufacturing company, violated the FLSA by wrongly classi
fying them as employees exempted from overtime benefits.104
In concluding that Novartis sales representatives did not qual
ify as administrative employees, the court focused primarily on an
amicus brief filed by the Secretary of Labor on behalf of the plain
tiffs.105 In the brief, the Secretary asserted that because the Novar
tis representatives did “not exercise discretion and independent
judgment, they [did not fall] within the . . . ‘administrative’ em
ployee categor[y] that [was] exempted from the FLSA overtime pay
requirements.”106 The court deferred to the Secretary of Labor’s
interpretation of the regulations that the representatives were not

103. Id. at 144. The court also reviewed whether the sales representatives were
exempted from the FLSA’s overtime requirements under the outside salesperson ex
emption; however, that issue is beyond the scope of this Note. For further discussion on
the outside salesperson exemption, see Locke, supra note 27. See also Chenensky v.
New York Life Ins. Co., No. 7 Civ. 11504 (WHP), 2010 WL 2710586 (D.N.Y. June 24,
2010) (discussing plaintiff who assisted customers in obtaining life insurance products
conducted “sales” under the FLSA); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635
F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that pharmaceutical sales representatives who pro
moted drug products to physicians fell within the outside sales exemption). Because the
court found the sales representatives to be exempt pursuant to the outside sales exemp
tion, it did not evaluate them according to the administrative exemption. Id. at 398.
Contra Ruggeri v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 585 F.Supp.2d 254, 268 (D.
Conn. 2008) (explaining that pharmaceutical sales representatives “do not and cannot
make or produce any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for
sale, or other disposition of Defendant’s products . . .”) (internal quotations omitted).
104. Novartis, 611 F.3d at 144.
105. Id. at 149.
106. Id. The Secretary of Labor outlined specific aspects of Novartis representa
tives’ job duties to indicate they did not meet the third prong of the test. When calling
on physicians, Novartis representatives provide doctors with information regarding
Novartis products in an effort to persuade them to prescribe Novartis products to their
patients. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 2. See also 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(3) (2004).
In speaking with doctors, Novartis representatives are required to deliver the com
pany’s “core message” by means of a scripted dialog. Amicus Brief, supra note 14 at 3.
Representatives are not permitted to stray from the script, and if asked a question for
which they do not have a scripted response, they are instructed to contact their supervi
sor before providing the physician with an answer. Id. at 6. Novartis representatives
must “close” the sale by asking the doctor for a commitment, although non-binding, to
prescribe Novartis medications. Id. at 5. Novartis trains its sales representatives in
sales techniques, and representatives are paid on commission, based on the volume of
prescriptions written by physicians to whom they are assigned. Id.
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administrative employees, and held that the Secretary’s interpreta
tions were entitled to “controlling” deference.107
The court and the Secretary referenced the section of the regu
lations indicating that an administrative employee must have pri
mary job duties that “‘include[ ] the exercise of discretion and
independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.’”108
In the Amicus Brief, the Secretary asserted that in order to “exer
cise discretion and independent judgment,” something more than
applying techniques or procedures established by the employer was
needed.109 The level of authority permitted the Novartis represent
atives was simply not enough to amount to the exercise of discre
tion and independent judgment.110 Because the court found it
appropriate to defer to the Secretary’s interpretation, it held that
the Novartis sales representatives were “not bona fide administra
tive employees within the meaning of the FLSA and the
regulations.”111
B. Cases Holding Salespeople “Administrative Employees”
Under the FLSA
Some courts have taken the opposite position from those dis
cussed in the previous section, holding that salespeople should be
classified as administrative employees and exempted from the over
time requirements of the FLSA. Courts that find salespeople to be
administrative employees focus on the managerial or administrative
aspects of the salesperson’s duties.
In the First Circuit case Cash v. Cycle Craft Company, Inc., 112
the court classified Plaintiff Thomas Cash as an administrative em
ployee exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions.113 Cash was
hired as “New Purchase/Customer Relations Manager,” responsible
for sales and solving customer service issues.114 Cycle Craft Com
pany fired him and Cash subsequently filed suit, alleging, inter alia,
107. Novartis, 611 F.3d at 149 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997));
see discussion infra Part IV.C.
108. Novartis, 611 F.3d at 155 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a) (2004)).
109. Id. at 156.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 157.
112. Cash v. Cycle Craft Co., Inc., 508 F.3d 680 (1st Cir. 2007).
113. Id. at 681.
114. Id.
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that the dealership had violated the FLSA by not paying overtime
wages during the course of his employ.115
On appeal, the First Circuit focused primarily on the second
and third prongs of the regulatory test. The court analyzed whether
Cash’s job duties related to management or business operations,116
and whether he exercised “discretion and independent judgment
with respect to matters of significance.”117
The court held that the plaintiff was an administrative em
ployee, relying on the reasoning from Reich v. John Alden Life Ins.
Co.118 Applying the third prong of the test, the court held that like
the plaintiffs in John Alden, Cash was “‘not merely [a] ‘skilled’
worker[ ] who operate[d] within a strict set of rules,’”119 but instead
he exercised discretion in carrying out his job duties. The court in
dicated, somewhat vaguely, that “Cash exercised discretion in react
ing to the unique needs of Boston Harley’s customers.”120 The First
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment that Cash’s job related
to the management and business operations of the store, and thus
he qualified as an exempt administrative employee within the
meaning of the FLSA.121
The Third Circuit also recently held that a pharmaceutical sales
representative qualified for the administrative exemption pursuant
to the FLSA in Smith v. Johnson & Johnson.122 In holding that the
Plaintiff Patty Lee Smith qualified for the administrative exemp
tion, the court considered the second and third prongs of the regu
latory tests. The court found that because her job possessed
“independent and managerial qualities,”123 and required a degree
of planning and foresight to implement a strategic plan, Smith met
the requirements of an administrative employee.124
115.

Id. at 682. Cash was fired on the spot due to an emotional problem at work.

Id.
116. Id. at 684.
117. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 (2004)).
118. Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997); see discussion
infra Part IV.A.2.
119. Cash, 508 F.3d at 685 (quoting Reich, 126 F.3d at 14).
120. Id. at 686.
121. Id. at 681, 685.
122. Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2010).
123. Id. at 285.
124. Id. The Third Circuit determined that the job duties of Smith satisfied the
second prong of the test regarding administrative employees because “[h]er non-man
ual position required her to form a strategic plan designed to maximize sales in her
territory.” Id. According to the court, because she followed a strategic plan she devel
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Clearly, the courts are not having any less difficulty classifying
salespeople than are employers, as evinced by the recent divergence
in outcomes. Such broad misclassification indicates that a uniform
system for classifying salespeople is warranted.
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
ADMINISTRATIVE EXEMPTION

THE

In recent years, the Department of Labor has spoken on sev
eral occasions regarding its interpretation of the application of the
administrative exemption. A clear pattern has emerged, demon
strating that the DOL, like the Second Circuit, interprets the FLSA
to indicate that salespeople do not fall within the administrative ex
emption.125 In addition to the 2004 amendments to the FLSA,
promulgated through formal notice and comment rulemaking pro
cedure, the DOL has declared that salespeople qualify for overtime
through informal guidance documents.
A. The Wage and Hour Opinion Letters Regarding Mortgage
Loan Officers
In September 2006, the DOL issued a Wage and Hour Opinion
Letter indicating that employees who performed duties typical of a
mortgage loan officer qualified for the administrative exemption to
the FLSA and were therefore not entitled to overtime pay.126 On
March 24, 2010, the DOL issued a new type of guidance document,
described as an “Administrator’s Interpretation” (AI).127 Signifi
cantly, the AI retracted the DOL’s previous position regarding the
exempt status of mortgage loan officers indicated in the 2006 Opin
ion Letter.128 The DOL argued the 2006 Opinion Letter was based
on “misleading assumption[s] and selective and narrow analysis,”129
oped on her own, Smith’s job duties directly related to the management or general
business operations of her employer. Id.
125. See, e.g., In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011); Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d
101, 107 (2d Cir. 2010); Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 587 F.3d 529, 534 (2d Cir. 2009).
126. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., OPINION LETTER FLSA 2006
31, at 1-2 (Sept. 8, 2006), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2006/2006_
09_08_31_FLSA.pdf . The DOL referenced job duties such as evaluating customer fi
nancial criteria to designate the appropriate loan product, responding to customer in
quiries and advising them about the risks and benefits of various loan products, and
other ‘“customer-specific persuasive sales activity.’” Id.
127. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14.
128. Id.
129. Id. (“Because of its misleading assumption and selective and narrow analy
sis, Opinion Letter FLSA 2006-31 does not comport with this interpretive guidance and
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and as such it was compelled to issue a new guidance document
addressing the issue.
In the 2006 Opinion Letter, the DOL applied the test enunci
ated in the 2004 amended regulations in order to determine
whether mortgage loan officers qualified as administrative employ
ees.130 The DOL conceded that the newly amended regulations in
dicated “that employees whose primary duty is inside sales cannot
qualify as exempt administrative employees,”131 but stated that the
new regulations further clarified that “many financial services em
ployees [such as mortgage loan officers] qualify as exempt adminis
trative employees, even if they are involved in some selling to
consumers.”132 According to the Opinion Letter, mortgage loan of
ficers generally had primary job duties other than sales.133 The
2006 Opinion Letter claimed mortgage loan officers’ job duties in
dicated they performed “work directly related to the management
or general business operations of the employer,” meeting the sec
ond prong of the test.134
Finally, the 2006 Opinion Letter indicated that mortgage loan
officers met the third prong of the test and performed duties that
required the “exercise of discretion and independent judgment.”135
The Opinion Letter determined the mortgage loan officers quali
is withdrawn. Similarly, an Opinion Letter dated February 16, 2001, 2001 WL 1558764,
also is withdrawn as inconsistent with this analysis.”).
130. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OPINION LETTER FLSA 2006-31, supra note 126, at 3.
Specifically, assuming the employees earned at least $455 per week and thus fulfilled
the salary prong of the test, the Opinion Letter evaluated whether mortgage loan of
ficers first performed “[w]ork that is ‘directly related to the management or general
business operations’ of the employer,” and second, whether the mortgage loan officers’
“primary duty include[d] the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with re
spect to matters of significance.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2004)).
131. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,146.
132. Id. The new regulations also made reference to case law indicating financial
services employees who sold financial products could also qualify as exempt employees.
See Hogan v. Allstate Ins. Co, 361 F.3d 621 (11th Cir. 2004); Reich v. John Alden Life
Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997); Wilshin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 212 F.Supp.2d 1360
(M.D. Ga. 2002).
133. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OPINION LETTER FLSA 2006-31, supra note 126, at 4
7. Specifically, the Opinion Letter indicated their work required them to analyze a
customer’s financial information, advise about various loan products, and determine
whether the customer qualified for a loan. Like the employees described in the pream
ble to the new regulations, the mortgage loan officers also “service[d] their employer’s
financial services business[es] by marketing, servicing, and promoting the employer’s
financial products.” Id. at 5.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 6. Such discretion generally “involve[d] the comparison and the evalu
ation of possible courses of conduct, and acting or making a decision after the various
possibilities have been considered.” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a) (2004)).

224

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:205

fied as exempt employees because they “evaluate[d] . . . products,
options, and variables . . . to determine which mortgage products
might serve customer’s needs.”136
The 2010 Administrator’s Interpretation analyzed mortgage
loan officers differently. In finding such workers did not qualify as
administrative employees, the AI also addressed the typical job du
ties of mortgage loan officers, referencing the regulations.137 Mort
gage loan officers’ job duties demonstrated that they did not
exercise discretion or independent judgment with respect to matters
of significance, nor were they involved in running or servicing their
employers’ businesses.138
The AI indicated exemptions from the FLSA overtime re
quirements “‘are to be narrowly construed against the employers
seeking to assert them and their application limited to those estab
lishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and
spirit.’”139 To this end, the AI determined the job duties of mort
gage loan officers placed them within the category of “production”
workers.140 To reach this conclusion, the AI invoked a number of
definitions in the regulations, emphasizing that when examined in
total, the regulations clearly stated the production nature of a typi
cal mortgage loan officer’s job placed the employee outside the
scope of the administrative exemption.141
Initially, the DOL applied the production versus administrative
dichotomy within the regulations. The relevant language states:
The phrase “directly related to the management or general busi
ness operations” refers to the type of work performed by the em
136. Id.
137. 29 C.F.R. § 541.2 (2004).
138. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14. According
to the DOL, mortgage loan officers generally receive internal leads and contact custom
ers, or field direct contacts from customers generated by the mortgage company’s mar
keting efforts. Id. Mortgage loan officers also collect financial information and run
credit reports on the customers that contact the mortgage company, in order to deter
mine whether the customers qualify for a particular loan product. Id. After running
the customer’s information through industry-specific software, mortgage loan officers
determine which available loan product would best suit the customer’s individual needs.
Id. Finally, mortgage loan officers frequently compile customer documents and assist
the underwriting department with finalizing loan documents for closing. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)).
140. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14.
141. Robert W. Pritchard, R. Brian Dixon & Andrew J. Voss, Department of La
bor Reverses Course: Mortgage Loan Officers Do Not Meet the Administrative Exemp
tion’s Requirements, ASAP LITTLER MENDELSON NEWSLETTER (Mar. 2010), available
at http://www.littler.com/files/press/pdf/2010_03_Wage_DOL_ReversesCourse_MortgageLoanOfficers.pdf.
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ployee. To meet this requirement, an employee must perform
work directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of
the business, as distinguished, for example, from working on a
manufacturing production line or selling a product in a retail or
service establishment.142

According to the AI, the legislative history of the FLSA illustrates
the intention of Congress that “the administrative exemption is
‘limited to those employees whose primary duty relates ‘to the ad
ministrative as distinguished from the production operations of a
business.’’”143 More specifically, the administrative exemption
“‘relates to employees whose work involves [the] servicing [of] the
business itself—employees who ‘can be described as staff rather
than line employees.’’”144
In order to determine whether mortgage loan officers’ job du
ties were analogous to “running [or] servicing the business” or
were, instead, more sales related, the AI looked to the regulations
for guidance.145 Factors that indicate whether an employee’s pri
mary job duty is sales-related, according to the regulations, are the
employee’s job description and qualifications, sales training, com
pensation structure (for example, commission-based), and what
proportion of the employee’s earnings can be attributed to sales.146
The AI referenced recent case law in support of its claim that a
mortgage loan officer’s primary job duties were related more to
sales than running the business.147 This indicated that “a careful
142. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2004).
143. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14 (quoting Fi
nal Rule, supra note 27, at 22,141).
144. Id. (quoting Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,141). The AI cited case law that
had recently relied on the “production versus administration dichotomy.” Bothell v.
Phase Metrics, 299 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002), (quoting Bratt v. County of Los
Angeles, 912 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 1990)) (“‘[P]roduction versus administration di
chotomy’ is intended to distinguish ‘between work related to the goods and services
which constitute the business’ marketplace offerings and work which contributes to run
ning the business itself.”); Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 587 F.3d 529, 535 (2d Cir. 2009)
(“[W]e have drawn an important distinction between employees directly producing the
good or service that is the primary output of a business and employees performing
general administrative work applicable to the running of any business.”).
145. Pritchard, Dixon, & Voss, supra note 141, at 2.
146. 29 C.F.R. § 541.504(b) (2004).
147. Pritchard, Dixon, & Voss, supra note 141, at 2. See Martin v. Cooper Elec
tric Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 905 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992) (“Any
[job] duties undertaken . . . in the course of ordinary selling do not constitute adminis
trative-type ‘servicing’ of Cooper’s wholesale business . . . . These activities are only
routine aspects of sales production.”); Casas v. Conseco, No. Civ.00–1512 (JRT/SRN),
2002 WL 507059, at *9 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2002) (Mortgage loan officers were “produc
tion rather than administrative employees”).
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examination of the law as applied to the mortgage loan officers’
duties demonstrate[d] that their primary duty [was] making sales
and, therefore, mortgage loan officers perform[ed] the production
work of their employers.”148
Clearly, the DOL interprets the regulations to indicate that a
primary duty of making sales is mutually exclusive to a primary
duty “directly related to the management or general business oper
ations of their employer or their employer’s customers.”149 Be
cause mortgage loan officers have the primary duty of selling loan
products of their employers, they do not qualify for an administra
tive exemption, according to the AI.150 The DOL was so certain
about the exempt status of this particular type of salesperson, it cre
ated a new category of guidance document to remedy its previous
mistake.
B. The Secretary of Labor’s Amicus Brief in Support of the
Plaintiffs in In re Novartis Wage and Hour Litigation
Further indicating the DOL’s position on administrative em
ployees, the Secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief on behalf of
the plaintiff pharmaceutical sales representatives in the 2010 Sec
ond Circuit Appeals Court case, In re Novartis Wage and Hour Liti
gation.151 The brief indicated that determining the sales
representatives in question qualified for the administrative exemp
tion ran contrary to “the regulatory requirement that employees
must exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to
148. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14. The cases
indicated that in analyzing the financial qualifications of a particular customer, “loan
officers [were] performing ‘screening for the benefit of the employer, rather than servic
ing for the benefit of the customer.’” Id. at 5 (quoting Pontius v. Delta Financial Corp.,
No. 04-1737, 2007 WL 1496692, at *9 & n.20 (D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2007)). Additionally,
mortgage loan officers were historically paid on commission, based on the number of
sales made or loans closed by a particular loan officer, another factor demonstrating
sales was their primary duty. Pritchard, Dixon & Voss, supra note 141, at 3. Mortgage
loan officers were also trained in sales techniques, and evaluated on the basis of the
number of loans they closed, further indicating the job duties of a mortgage loan officer
were sales-related. Id.
149. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14.
150. Id.
151. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011). The Secretary of Labor is charged with “administer[ing] and
enforce[ing] the FLSA . . . and [therefore] has a compelling interest in ensuring that it is
interpreted correctly.” Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 1 (citation omitted). See also 29
U.S.C. §§ 204(a), (b), 211(a) (2006). For a discussion of deference to the DOL’s inter
pretation of its own regulations, see infra Part IV.C. See also discussion of the Novartis
case, supra Part II.A.
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matters of significance in order to qualify for the administrative
exemption.”152
The DOL amicus brief detailed the primary job duties of a
pharmaceutical sales representative. Arguing that although Novar
tis representatives exercise some discretion in carrying out their pri
mary job duties, the Secretary of Labor indicated the level of
discretion exercised was not sufficient to bring them within the
boundaries of the administrative exemption.153 Novartis did not
meet its burden of proving its sales representatives exercised discre
tion and independent judgment sufficient to qualify them for the
exemption.154 The applicable section of the regulations defines the
type of discretion that would qualify an employee for the exemp
tion.155 Some of the examples point to whether the employee has
authority to deviate from established procedures without prior ap
proval, whether the employee has authority to negotiate and bind
the company on significant matters, and whether the employee pro
vides consultation or expert advice to management.156 The Pream
ble to the Final Rule indicated that employees who met at least two
or three of the examples listed would be considered to have exer
cised discretion and independent judgment.157
Exemptions to the FLSA are intended “to be narrowly con
strued against the employers seeking to assert them.”158 The Secre
tary of Labor, in Novartis, argued that the job duties of the Novartis
pharmaceutical sales representatives did not comport with the ex
amples listed in the regulations and, therefore, Novartis representa
tives could not be considered to have exercised discretion and
independent judgment.159 Because Novartis representatives did not
meet the third prong of the regulatory test for administrative em
ployees, the Secretary of Labor argued they did not qualify for the
exemption.160

152. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 2. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(3) (2004). See
also discussion of the Novartis case, supra Part II.A.
153. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 2.
154. Id. at 10.
155. Id. at 10 n.6.
156. Id. at 18 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b) (2004)).
157. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 11.
158. Id. at 7.
159. Id. at 21.
160. Id. at 9-15.
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TODAY’S SALESPERSON IS YESTERDAY’S STRAW BOSS;
APPLYING THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT TO
THE MODERN WORKPLACE

The disparity among the courts as to whether to classify sales
people as administrative employees illustrates the need for a
streamlined system of legal analysis; one that promotes efficiency
and fairness in administering FLSA overtime claims. The produc
tion/administration dichotomy is a useful tool in understanding how
to classify salespeople. Construing the exemptions to the FLSA
narrowly, it becomes clear that the category of production employ
ees includes salespeople; sales personnel, then, cannot be exempted
from the FLSA’s overtime protections. Furthermore, the DOL has
been clear that sales personnel are within the category of workers
entitled to overtime. Deferring to the DOL, as is appropriate in
these circumstances, would result in courts finding that salespeople
must be paid overtime pursuant to the FLSA.
A. Reviewing Courts Should Apply the Production/
Administration Dichotomy
The administrative exemption was always intended to apply
only to those employees whose job duties relate to running a busi
ness.161 From the original promulgation of the FLSA, the DOL has
indicated a clear distinction between “production” and “administra
tion” work,162 the goal being that “only those employees involved
in the business of business qualified [for the exemption].”163
The preamble to the 2004 amended regulations described the
production/administration dichotomy as follows:
The Department believes that the dichotomy is still a relevant
and useful tool in appropriate cases to identify employees who
should be excluded from the exemption. As the Department
[has] recognized . . . , this exemption is intended to be limited to
those employees whose duties relate “to the administrative as
distinguished from the ‘production’ operations of a business.”
161. Snider and Associates, LLC, Administrative/Production Dichotomy–DOL
Revisions to FLSA Regs, http://www.sniderlaw.com/articles/Administrative_Production
_Dichotomy_FLSA_and_DOL.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
162. Id.
163. Id. (emphasis added); see also Bothell v. Phase Metrics, Inc., 299 F.3d 1120,
1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[The dichotomy distinguishes] between work related to the goods
and services which constitute the business’ marketplace offerings and work which con
tributes to running the business itself.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Thus, it relates to employees whose work involves servicing the
business itself—employees who “can be described as staff rather
than line employees, or as functional rather than departmental
heads.” . . . . Based on these principles, the Department provided
in proposed section 541.201(a) that the administrative exemption
covers only employees performing a particular type of work—
work related to assisting with the running or servicing of the
business.164

When the FLSA was promulgated originally, the regulations re
ferred to production jobs such as “key punch operators, legmen,
straw bosses and gang leaders,” which no longer exist in the modern
workplace.165 To be sure, the Preamble to the 2004 regulations in
dicates that the purpose of the change to the regulations was “to
restore the overtime protections intended by the FLSA,” which had
become “severely eroded,” principally because the DOL has failed
to update the regulations and properly define the exceptions166
Such language illustrates the DOL’s intention to apply the regula
tions broadly, so as to provide overtime benefits to a greater num
ber of workers who had, according to the DOL, lost the protections
of the FLSA over time.167
Significantly, the current regulations retain the distinction be
tween production and administrative employees.168 Discussed
within the context of the second prong of the regulatory test for
administrative employees, the regulations emphasize the dichotomy
as follows:
To meet th[e] requirement [of performing work directly related
to the management or general business operations], an employee
must perform work directly related to assisting with the running
or servicing of the business, as distinguished, for example, from
working on a manufacturing production line or selling a product
in a retail or service establishment.169

In the most general sense, a worker who assists with production
within a business is outside the boundaries of the administrative ex
emption, while an employee who is involved with running the busi
164. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,141.
165. Id. at 22122; see also supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing
the shift in the American economy to a more service-oriented employment base).
166. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122. Although the preamble also discussed
the other white-collar exemptions, references to the other exemptions have been elimi
nated as a discussion of the other exemptions is outside the scope of this Note.
167. Id.
168. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2004).
169. Id. (emphasis added).
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ness in some way is not entitled to overtime compensation. These
examples from the legislative history of the FLSA illustrate why
reviewing courts should apply the production/administration di
chotomy in order to determine whether employees qualify for the
administrative exemption.
Some courts have applied the production/administration dis
tinction. The Second Circuit, for example, held in Davis v. J.P.
Morgan Chase,170 that according to the second prong of the regula
tory test, the plaintiff employees performed work that qualified as
either administrative or “production/sales,” but not both.171 The
Davis court, relying on Reich v. State of New York,172 construed
“production” broadly173 and held that the reasoning in the Reich
case, regarding the production/administration dichotomy, applied
to the facts of the current case. The court indicated that a “literal
reading of ‘production’ to require tangible goods ha[d] no basis in
law or regulation.”174
The Second Circuit again applied the production/administra
tion dichotomy in Reiseck v. Universal Communications of Miami,
Inc., in evaluating whether an advertising saleswoman was entitled
to overtime pay.175 Initially, as it had done in the Davis case, the
Second Circuit interpreted “production” broadly, holding that the
advertising space the plaintiff sold was the “product” of the defen

170. Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 587 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 2009).
171. Id. at 532. The primary job duty of the plaintiff underwriters in the Davis
case was to sell the bank’s loan products. Id. at 534. As such, the court held the plain
tiffs’ contribution to the company did not involve management decisions or decisions
regarding the general business operations of the company, such as the human resource
or advertising worker hypothesized in the regulations. Id. (referencing the pre-amend
ment regulations); see 29 C.F.R. § 541.2 (2002). Instead, the Plaintiffs’ work concerned
the “‘production’ of loans–the fundamental service provided by the bank.” Id. at 534.
172. Reich v. State of New York, 3 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S.
1163 (1994) (regarding the exempt status of state police investigators).
173. Davis, 587 F.3d at 532. In Reich, the Second Circuit considered the criminal
investigations conducted a “product” and held that state police investigators did not
qualify for the administrative exemption because ‘“the primary function of the Investi
gators . . . [was] to conduct–or ‘produce’-its criminal investigations,’ the . . . Investiga
tors fell ‘squarely on the production side of the line’” and were therefore found to be
entitled to overtime pay. Id. at 532 (quoting Reich, 3 F.3d at 587-88). Further clarify
ing, the court indicated intangible goods, such as criminal investigations and the loans
that were the subject of the current case, were to be considered “products” pursuant to
the FLSA. Id. at 532-33.
174. Id. at 532.
175. Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2010).
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dant employer.176 As a sales employee, Reiseck did not qualify for
the administrative exemption.177
To reach this conclusion, the court referenced the section of
the amended regulations addressing financial sector workers.178
Again applying a broad interpretation of “production” to intangible
products, the court analogized the plaintiff’s sale of advertising
space to the sale of financial products considered in the regula
tions.179 Through application of the production/administration di
chotomy, the Second Circuit again reached the conclusion that a
plaintiff salesperson was not an administrative employee under the
FLSA.180
Certainly, an argument can be made that the production/ad
ministration dichotomy does not automatically indicate the exempt
status of an employee.181 Indeed, some reviewing courts have de
clined to apply the dichotomy, finding it inapplicable in certain con
texts.182 In fact, the Preamble to the 2004 regulations emphasized
that the “dichotomy has always been illustrative—but not disposi
tive—of exempt status . . . .”183 The dichotomy should be used as
176. Id. at 106 (considering “sales” and “production” work interchangeably).
177. Id. at 107 (relying on the description of the plaintiff’s job duties in the re
cord, the court held Reiseck should be considered a sales employee).
178. Id. at 107-08. Specifically, the regulations made the distinction between a
financial sector worker whose primary duty is to “‘market[ ], service[ ], or promote[ ]
the employer’s financial products,’ . . . [and] ‘an employee whose primary duty is selling
financial products.’” Id. (referencing 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b) (2004)) (emphasis added
by the court). The former would qualify for the administrative exemption, while the
latter would not. Id. at 108.
179. Id. at 107. “Universal’s sale of advertising space is similar to a financial ser
vices company’s sale of financial products. Neither fits neatly within the traditional
retail sales model, yet both are standard products sold directly to the clients.” Id. at
108.
180. Id. at 108. The court adopted the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the regu
lations in the Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992). In Martin, the court interpreted the phrase “promoting
sales” to mean increasing sales generally, rather than selling directly to customers.
Martin, 940 F.2d at 905.
181. See, e.g., Pritchard, Dixon, & Voss, supra note 141 (referencing the language
in the Preamble to the 2004 regulations specifying the dichotomy has “always been
illustrative-but not dispositive-of exempt status”). Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,141.
182. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. 02–6205–TC,
2004 WL 1857112, at * 13-14 (D. Or. Aug. 18, 2004) (claiming Final Rule had moved
away from the dichotomy in the service industry context); Heffelfinger v. Elec. Data
Sys. Corp., 580 F.Supp.2d 933, 956 (D. Cal. 2008) (administrative/production “dichot
omy is often of limited use outside of the manufacturing context in which it was de
vised”); Roe-Midgett v. CC Servs., Inc., 512 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that
dichotomy no longer applies in the modern service industry context).
183. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,141.
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“one piece of the larger inquiry,” and provide a definitive answer
regarding whether an employee qualifies for the administrative ex
emption “only when work falls squarely on the production side of
the line.”184
However, it is important to note the DOL indicated the dichot
omy should be illustrative. A genuine need for a distinguishing test
arises in the case of sales personnel who, as the division among the
courts indicates, have some job duties that arguably place them in
both camps. Certainly, a salesperson’s duties involving the general
operations of his or her employer’s business might well indicate he
or she should be considered an administrative employee.185 But in
this regard, while not dispositive, the production/administration di
chotomy can be used as a baseline determination of the salesper
son’s exempt status.186 From this starting point, the primary duties
of the salesperson should be measured against the regulatory re
quirements, where it will be shown that the employee does not
qualify for the exemption.187 Since salespeople are “producing” the
products of their respective employers, they will not be found to be
exercising discretion and independent judgment, and it will be clear
they do not qualify for the exemption.188
A strong policy argument can be made for using the produc
tion/administration dichotomy when analyzing the exempt adminis
trative status of salespeople. As indicated in the Davis case, the
fundamental purpose of the overtime requirements was both quan
titative and qualitative. The overtime requirements were intended
to increase the quantity of available jobs by pressuring employers to
spread employment across a greater number of workers in order to
avoid paying the higher wage.189 Additionally, the requirements
were intended to raise the quality of the work performed, by com
pensating workers at a higher rate for the “burden of a workweek
beyond the hours fixed in the Act.”190
184. See, e.g., Pritchard, Dixon, & Voss, supra note 141, at 2 (citing Final Rule,
supra note 27, at 22,141) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
185. Snider and Associates, LLC, supra note 161, at 2.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 587 F.3d 529, 535 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing
Overnight Motor Transp. Co., Inc. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577-78 (1942), superseded by
statute, Portal-to-Pay Act of 1947, ch. 52 § 1, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 251 (2006)).
190. Id.
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The policy behind the overtime requirements is particularly
relevant today. The FLSA was promulgated in the Depression era
as New Deal legislation.191 Our country is now faced with many of
the same challenges faced by Americans in 1938. More than two
years after the official end of the worst economic downturn since
the Great Depression, unemployment continues to hover at signifi
cantly high rates.192 In light of the current economic conditions, the
protections of the FLSA are as relevant now as they were when the
Act was first promulgated.
Applying the production/administration dichotomy is a means
to achieve the end result of the policy behind the FLSA. The Davis
court indicates that although any type of job can be spread among
several workers, work can more readily be spread among produc
tion employees than among those classified as administrative.193
There is a “direct correlation between hours worked and materials
produced in the case of . . . production workers, [a measurement
that] does not exist [with] administrative employees.”194 As such,
considering any worker paid on a production basis, for example
salespeople compensated by commission on the basis of their sales
or production, would broaden the application of the FLSA to a
greater number of employees. Applying the FLSA to a greater
number of employees fulfills the original work-spreading mission of
the FLSA,195 and comports with the aim of the 2004 regulations to
restore overtime provisions to workers who lost the protections of
the FLSA over time.196
The production/administration dichotomy is an essential tool in
analyzing whether a salesperson qualifies as an exempt administra
tive employee. Current conditions in our national economy in par
191.

Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1245-46; see supra note 21 and accompanying

text.
192. See World Bank: Economy worst since Depression, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar.
9, 2009, 7:04 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/09/news/international/global_econ
omy_world_bank/. (regarding the status of the current economic downturn); see
Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, Unemployment Rate, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last vis
ited Apr. 15, 2012) (demonstrating the unemployment rate from 2002 to the present).
The chart on the website indicates the unemployment rate during the recession was
highest in October, 2009 at 10%. Id. The rate reported in March, 2012 remained high,
reducing only slightly to 8.2%. Id. At the start of the recession in January, 2008, the
unemployment rate was 5%. Id.
193. Davis, 587 F.3d at 535.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,123.
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ticular make application of the production/administration
dichotomy sound policy when analyzing the status of salespeople.
B. Exemptions to the FLSA Overtime Requirements Should Be
Narrowly Construed
Since the Supreme Court decided Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky,
Inc. in 1960,197 courts have held that exemptions to remedial em
ployment statutes must be construed narrowly against employers
seeking to assert them, and should be “‘limited to those establish
ments plainly and unmistakably within [the exemption’s] terms and
spirit.’”198 However, in examining case law interpreting the admin
istrative employee exemption to the FLSA, it is clear that courts
have applied these principles differently.
The Second Circuit has correctly followed the intentions of the
Arnold court. Construing the administrative exemption to the
FLSA narrowly would require courts to include a wide variety of
job designations among those qualifying for overtime wages. Par
ticularly because the nature of jobs available to the American
worker has changed so dramatically from the time the FLSA was
promulgated, courts must examine a litigant’s job with the “terms
and spirit”199 of the FLSA in mind, as applying the FLSA literally
to the modern job market is no longer possible.200 This Note argues
that the Second Circuit has properly interpreted the FLSA as ap
plying to a broader category of modern jobs. This broad applica
tion succeeds in narrowly construing the exemptions to the FLSA,
as well as limiting the Act’s exemptions to those jobs “plainly and
unmistakably within [the exemption’s] terms and spirit.”201
1. The Second Circuit
In Reiseck v. Universal Communications of Miami, the Second
Circuit acknowledged that a magazine publisher was not the proto
typical business originally contemplated by the FLSA, as it was
197. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388 (1960).
198. Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting
Arnold, 361 U.S. at 392).
199. Arnold, 361 U.S. at 392. For a discussion regarding the changing nature of
jobs available to the American worker, see supra note 161 and accompanying text.
200. Tilson & Glenn, supra note 39, at 171. See also supra notes 42-49 and ac
companying text (discussing background of how the job market has changed since the
original promulgation of FLSA).
201. Arnold, 361 U.S. at 392.
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neither a manufacturer nor a retailer.202 Designating whether the
plaintiff’s work qualified as exempt pursuant to the FLSA was
therefore more difficult.203
The Reiseck court interpreted the regulations broadly in favor
of employees by determining that Reiseck’s primary job duties
placed her outside the administrative exemption.204 As discussed,
the Reiseck court defined advertising space as a “product” of the
magazine.205 If magazine space was a product, and Reiseck’s pri
mary job duty was to sell that product, her job duties placed her on
the production rather than the administration side of the company.
According to the regulations, performing production work indi
cated that an employee’s primary job duty was not “‘directly re
lated to management policies or general business operations of
[the] employer,’”206 and therefore was outside the boundaries of
the administrative exemption.207
Universal’s sale of advertising space is similar to a financial ser
vices employee’s sale of financial products.208 “Neither fits neatly
[into] the traditional retail sales model” within the original FLSA,
yet both are considered products sold directly to clients.209 The
Reiseck court’s broad application of the production/administration
dichotomy and broad analogy to the financial services employees
202. Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir.
2010). See discussion supra Part II.A.
203. Reiseck, 591 F.3d at 106.
204. Id. at 107. The court conceded Reiseck performed duties other than actual
sales during the course of her employ. Id. However, the court relied on the definition
within the regulations that “an employee’s ‘primary duty’ is the duty that consumes a
‘major part, or over [fifty] percent, of the employee’s time.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.103 (2004)) (“[D]efining ‘primary duty’ for the executive employee.”). The court
also referred to 29 C.F.R. § 541.206, which “appli[es] the definition of ‘primary duty’
for the executive employee to the administrative employee.” Reiseck 591 F.3d at 107
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.206 (2004)).
205. See discussion supra Part II.A.
206. Reiseck, 591 F.3d at 105 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(a) (2004)).
207. Id. at 107. Although this case evaluated the plaintiff’s exempt status by ap
plying the pre-2004 regulations, the court indicated the new regulations were entitled to
some deference if the reviewing court deemed them persuasive. Id. at 105-08 (citing
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
208. Id. at 108. The court analogized the discussion of financial sector employees
within the 2004 regulations in determining the sale, or production, of the company’s
advertising space placed Ms. Reiseck outside the administrative exemption. Id. Like
the financial sector employee who sold her employer’s financial products directly, in
selling her employer’s product of advertising space, Ms. Reiseck also fell outside of the
boundaries of the administrative exemption. Id.
209. Id.
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discussed within the regulations are examples of the Second Circuit
construing the exemptions narrowly against employers.
In holding the plaintiff class of pharmaceutical sales represent
atives did not qualify for the administrative exemption, the Second
Circuit also construed the exemptions narrowly in In re Novartis
Wage and Hour Litigation.210 The Novartis court focused on the
third prong of the regulatory test, whether the employees “exer
cise[d] discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters
of significance.”211 Although the court conceded that the sales rep
resentatives’ job duties permitted some discretion and independent
judgment, the court held the sales representatives did not exercise
enough discretion and independent judgment to elevate them to the
status of an exempt employee.212 Such an interpretation of the job
duties of the plaintiff sales representatives indicates the Novartis
court construed the exemptions narrowly against the employer.
The Second Circuit also construed the exemptions to the FLSA
narrowly in Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase.213 The court determined
that the plaintiffs had a primary job duty of selling loans for their
bank employer. As discussed, the Second Circuit also applied the
production/administration dichotomy in evaluating the exempt sta
tus of the loan officers. As it had done in the Reiseck decision, the
court reasoned that because the plaintiffs’ primary duty was to sell
loan products, their work was unrelated to either setting manage
ment policies of the bank or to its general business operations, and
instead concerned the “production” of loans.214 As such, the loan
officers did not meet the second prong of the regulatory test, that
their “work [be] directly related to management policies or general
210. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 157 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011); see Leffler, supra note 77 (“Rejecting a broad reading of
the FLSA’s exemptions, the Second Circuit relied upon the [ ] DOL’s narrow interpre
tation of the regulations . . . .”). The Novartis court relied heavily on the amicus brief
filed on behalf of the plaintiffs by the DOL. See discussion supra Part III.B.
211. Novartis, 611 F.3d at 149. The sales representatives had the freedom to de
cide in what order to call on physicians, how to best use the budget they were given for
sales presentations, and how to designate the use of the free samples they were given
for distribution. Id. at 157. Additionally, sales representatives tailored their presenta
tions to best suit the particular physician audience, and selected which speakers would
be most appropriate to present to doctors reluctant to accept individual sales calls. Id.
at 145-46.
212. Id. at 144-46.
213. Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 587 F.3d 529, 535 (2d Cir. 2009).
214. Id. at 534. The Second Circuit decided the Davis case a few weeks before
hearing arguments on the Reiseck case. See id. at 537.
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business operations . . . .”215 Thus, they did not qualify for the ad
ministrative exemption. In viewing the job duties of the loan of
ficers in this way, the Second Circuit again construed the
exemptions narrowly against the bank employer.
Construing the exemptions to the FLSA narrowly creates a
presumption against the exemption. To rebut the presumption, an
employer seeking to apply the exemption has the burden to prove
an employee qualifies for the exemption.216 Courts in the Second
Circuit have ruled on the exempt status of the employees in ques
tion as though they were presumed not to be exempt. As such, the
Second Circuit has construed the exemptions to the FLSA
narrowly.
2. The Majority Rule
The majority of courts ruling on whether sales personnel qual
ify as exempt administrative employees has not followed the direc
tive of Arnold, which requires exemptions to the FLSA to be
narrowly construed against employers.217 The First Circuit, for ex
ample, has fallen short of Arnold’s mandate. In Cash v. Cycle Craft
Co., Inc.,218 the court addressed whether a salesperson qualified for
the administrative exemption in a setting that had been directly ad
dressed in the regulations, a retail store.219
In holding that the plaintiff was an administrative employee,
the First Circuit relied on the reasoning from Reich v. John Alden
Life Ins. Co., where the court held that the life insurance company’s
marketing representatives were administrative employees.220 Simi
larly, the Cash court held that Cash’s job duties placed him within
the boundaries of the administrative exemption.221 The First Cir
215. Id. at 537. The court indicated that a “literal reading of ‘production,’” lim
ited only to “tangible goods has no basis in law or regulation.” Id. at 532.
216. Novartis, 611 F.3d at 150 (“The burden of proving that employees fall within
such an exemption is on the employer.”).
217. See, e.g., Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010); Dar
veau v. Detecon 515 F.3d 334, 339 (4th Cir. 2008); Cash v. Cycle Craft Company, Inc.,
508 F.3d 680, 686 (1st Cir. 2007).
218. Cash v. Cycle Craft Company, Inc., 508 F.3d 680, 684 (1st Cir. 2007).
219. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2004). The regulation states that in order for work
to be considered as directly related to the management or general business operations
of the employer, it must be “directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of
the business, as distinguished, for example, from working on a manufacturing produc
tion line or selling a product in a retail or service establishment.” Id. (emphasis added).
220. Cash, 508 F.3d at 685.
221. Id. at 686. The plaintiff was hired as a New Purchase/Customer Service
Manager, whose job duties included working with various departments within the com
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cuit held that Cash qualified for the administrative exemption be
cause he “did not simply produce a product; he exercised
independent judgment as he engaged in the company’s business
operations.”222
Such a literal and limited interpretation of the regulations does
not comport with the command that the exemptions be construed
narrowly.223 Arnold’s holding, that the exemptions apply “‘to
those establishments plainly and unmistakably within [the exemp
tions’] terms and spirit,’”224 indicates that the Supreme Court inter
preted the regulations to require that any business fitting within the
“spirit” of the FLSA should have its exemptions narrowly
construed.
As a retail establishment, the business at issue in this case is
exactly the type of establishment that should fall outside of the ex
emption.225 A narrow application of the exemption would likely
result in finding that the work performed by Cash was incidental to
sales, and therefore qualifying as direct sales or production work.
The regulations indicate that “[p]romotional work [which] is actu
ally performed incidental to and in conjunction with an employee’s
own outside sales or solicitations is exempt work[, while] promo
tional work that is incidental to sales made, or to be made, by some
one else is not exempt outside sales work.”226
While the marketing representatives in the John Alden case
worked with agents outside of their company to make sales, Cash
pany to ensure customers received their motorcyles outfitted as they had ordered, and
liaison between customers and the company to ensure the motorcycle was delivered and
the customer was satisfied with the purchase. Id. at 682. Cash was ‘“engaged in some
thing more than routine selling efforts focused simply on particular sales transactions.’”
Id. at 685 (quoting Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1, 10 (1997). Also,
because “Cash exercised discretion in reacting to the unique needs of [the company’s]
customers, . . . [he was] ‘not merely [a] ‘skilled’ worker[ ] who operate[d] within a strict
set of rules.’” Id. at 686 (quoting Reich, 126 F.3d at 14).
222. Id.
223. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960); see Cash, 508 F.3d
at 683.
224. Arnold, 361 U.S. at 392.
225. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2004) (addressing retail establishments).
226. 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(a) (2004). Although this section of the regulations ad
dresses the outside sales exemption rather than the administrative exemption, other
sections of the regulations apply a definition within one exemption to another of the
exemptions. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (2004); 29 C.F.R. § 541.206 (2004). For example,
§ 541.103 defines “primary duty” for the executive employee, while § 541.206 applies
the definition of “primary duty” for the executive employee to the administrative em
ployee. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 541.103. Such a practice is an indication the different sections
of the regulations are intended to apply to each other.
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worked with other employees within the same business to do the
same.227 His role can be interpreted as another step in the line of
producing or selling the product of the company, the Harley Davidson motorcycle. In other words, he helped “produce” the
motorcycles, as his role was to ensure customers received what they
ordered, and were satisfied with their purchases. He was not in
volved with management decisions, or with running the business.
As a production worker, he is the prototypical employee intended
to be protected by the FLSA,228 and therefore, outside the bounda
ries of its exemptions.
The Third Circuit, like the First Circuit, has failed to follow
Arnold’s mandate. In Smith v. Johnson & Johnson,229 the court
held that the plaintiff was exempted from the overtime require
ments of the FLSA as an administrative employee.230 However, the
Third Circuit’s application of the principle enunciated in the Arnold
case falls short.231 In holding that Smith performed duties directly
related to the general business operations of the company, the court
referred only to the strategic plan Smith developed.232 To be sure,
Smith had no involvement in determining the overall business strat
egy of Johnson & Johnson. The court disregarded the strict param
eters within which the plaintiff was expected to perform her job.233
Although Smith executed her job without oversight, she was told
what to do and say when calling upon referring physicians.234 In
these ways, Smith’s job was analogous to the “line worker,” or pro
duction worker, contemplated by the original iteration of the
FLSA.235 The Smith case indicates that the Third Circuit has not
held the defendant employer to its burden of proving the plaintiff
227. Cash, 508 F.3d at 685.
228. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a).
229. Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2010).
230. Id. at 285. In so deciding, the court referred to several aspects of her job.
Id. at 282. Although her employer, Johnson & Johnson, gave Smith a list of how many
physicians to call on each day, she decided which doctors to see and when. Id. While
Smith was given a budget, she had control over how to spend the money she was allo
cated. Id. The court also relied on the testimony of the plaintiff, in which she indicated
that she had freedom and responsibility in her job because she was unsupervised most
of the time. Id. In her deposition, Smith also claimed she ran her territory in the man
ner she wanted. Id. at 282-83. See discussion supra Part II.B.
231. See Smith, 593 F.3d at 284.
232. Id. at 285.
233. Id. at 282. For example, the plaintiff was given a list of specific doctors to
target, a prepared “message” to convey to the physicians, and was provided with visual
aids to use during sales meetings. Id.
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,142.
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fell within the exemption, and has not succeeded in construing the
exemption narrowly.
The failure of the Third Circuit to construe the exemption nar
rowly raises an important issue regarding the application of the reg
ulatory test. The court conceded that applying the test as they have
could prompt different results based on slightly different facts.236 A
test so susceptible to different interpretations is fundamentally un
fair. The court itself indicated that such a test could lead to a cir
cumstance where two representatives employed by the same
company might find themselves in a situation where one received
overtime benefits and one did not.237 Such an imbalance is a fur
ther indication that courts should follow the Second Circuit’s lead
in construing the exemptions to the FLSA narrowly.
While the Second Circuit has construed the exemptions nar
rowly, the majority of reviewing courts, in holding generally that
salespeople are exempt administrative employees, have not done
so. When a salesperson’s job duties have aspects of exempt and
nonexempt work, as is often true, case law dictates the exemptions
to the regulations are to be construed narrowly and the employer’s
burden in exempting an employee from overtime pay is high. Such
a high burden of proof indicates sales personnel are more likely
than not to fall outside the administrative exemption, as selling is
considered “production” in the production/administration dichot
omy. Through their literal and limited application of the regula
tions, courts in the majority have set up a circumstance where the
regulations apply differently to employees with identical job duties,
and apply exemptions to jobs the FLSA clearly intended to protect.
Permitting such an outcome flies in the face of the purpose of con
struing the exemptions narrowly, and of the FLSA overall.
C. The DOL is Entitled to Deference
The DOL has spoken on a number of occasions regarding the
exempt status of sales personnel.238 This Note argues that because
the DOL is entitled to deference in interpreting the FLSA and its
own regulations, reviewing courts should follow the lead of the
236. Smith, 593 F.3d at 283 n.1 (“[W]e recognize that based on different facts,
courts, including this Court, considering similar issues involving sales representatives
for other pharmaceutical companies, or perhaps even for J & J, might reach a different
result than that we reach here.”).
237. Id.
238. See supra Part III (regarding the DOL’s interpretation of the exempt status
of salespeople in recent years).
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DOL, as the Second Circuit has done, thereby holding that, as a
general rule, salespeople do not qualify for the administrative
exemption.
1. The 2004 Amendments: The “Final Rule”
Pursuant to the express language of the statute, the Secretary
of Labor has the delegated power to administer and enforce the
FLSA.239 After undergoing the requisite notice and comment pro
cedure, the DOL promulgated amended regulations defining and
delimiting the overtime exemptions to the FLSA.240 When the lan
guage of a statute is ambiguous, reviewing courts are required to
give controlling deference to an agency’s interpretation of the stat
ute unless the interpretation is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or
contrary to the statute.241
The FLSA does not unambiguously define the parameters of
the white-collar exemptions. The statute merely exempts “any em
ployee employed in a bona fide . . . administrative capacity . . .”242
without indicating which workers qualify as administrative employ
ees. Because the statute is ambiguous, the agency regulations must
define what is meant by an “administrative employee.” In fact, the
statute gives the Secretary of Labor a clear directive to “define[ ]
and delimit[ ] [administrative employees] from time to time by reg
ulations.”243 In the 2004 Final Rule, the DOL outlined the appro
priate method to determine whether an employee is exempt from
the Act’s overtime provisions.244 The DOL’s official position re
garding how the FLSA is to be interpreted is entitled to controlling
deference, and therefore has the force of law.245
239.
240.

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 204(a)-(b), 211(a), 216(c), 217 (2006).
Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122; see supra notes 51-66 and accompanying

text.
241. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984).
[T]he court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather,
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the ques
tion for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Id. at 843; see also Long Island Care at Home, Ltd v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 165-68, 171-75
(2007); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980
(2005); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001).
242. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (2006).
243. Id.
244. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2004).
245. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
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The FLSA was established as a remedial statute, and, there
fore, must be interpreted broadly in favor of protecting the right of
employees to receive overtime pay.246 As indicated, the Final Rule
construes the statute broadly by including a wide array of workers
in the category of those entitled to overtime compensation.247 At
the same time, the Final Rule illustrates the DOL’s conscious deci
sion to retain the production/administration dichotomy in the
amended regulations.248 Because the DOL is entitled to controlling
deference regarding its interpretation of the FLSA, reviewing
courts have been charged with the duty of both construing the Act
broadly and applying the production/administration dichotomy in
evaluating the status of employees as administrative.
The Second Circuit has succeeded in giving due deference to
the DOL’s position. Recent case law indicates that the Second Cir
cuit has both construed the FLSA broadly in favor of employees
and applied the production/administration dichotomy.249 Both the
Reiseck and Davis cases are evidence of the Second Circuit prop
erly applying the 2004 regulations.
Conversely, the majority of the reviewing courts have not met
the DOL’s directive to construe the FLSA broadly in favor of em
ployees.250 The First Circuit ignored the directive of the DOL in
246. See, e.g., Herman v. Fabri-Ctrs. of Am., Inc. 308 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir.
2002). The FLSA is “‘remedial and humanitarian in purpose,’ and ‘must not be inter
preted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.’” Id. (quoting Tennessee Coal, Iron &
R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944).
247. See supra Part III.
248. To that end, the 2004 regulations limited the administrative exemption to
only those employees whose “work directly relate[d] to assisting with the running or
servicing of the business” as distinguished from production or selling. 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.201(a) (2004); see supra Part III.
249. See, e.g., Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101, 108
(2d Cir. 2010). The court’s treatment of the advertising space the plaintiff sold as the
“product” of the employer magazine in the Reiseck case is an example of such broad
construction. Id. at 106-07. Also, the court applied the production/administration di
chotomy in holding that because Ms. Reiseck’s primary duty was to sell the product of
the magazine, her work fell into the production category, and thus did not contribute to
the business of running the business. Id. at 107. See also Davis v. J.P. Morgan Chase,
587 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 2009). The court construed the FLSA broadly by holding the
loans sold by the plaintiff underwriter to be a “product” of the bank. Id. at 534. Addi
tionally, in determining the plaintiff was not exempt, the court referenced the specific
section of the regulations addressing the production/administration dichotomy. Id. at
535. The Second Circuit effectively established a rule that intangible goods, such as the
loan products which were the subject of the Davis case, can be considered “products”
under the FLSA. Id. at 532.
250. See, e.g., Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010), Cash
v. Cycle Craft Co., Inc., 508 F.3d 680 685-86 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Darveau v.
Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 337-39 (4th Cir. 2008). The Fourth Circuit failed to con
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the 2004 regulations in Cash v. Cycle Craft Co., Inc.251 Despite the
fact that the plaintiff’s role appeared to clearly fall on the produc
tion side of selling motorcycles, the First Circuit explicitly shunned
the broad application of the FLSA favoring employees and found
the plaintiff to be exempt from the overtime requirements.252
In Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, the Third Circuit also held that
the plaintiff qualified as an exempt administrative employee.253 In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on limited facts, such as
the fact that the plaintiff developed her own strategic plan to exe
cute the duties of her position.254 The court disregarded the dichot
omy test within the regulations, ignoring the fact that the plaintiff’s
primary duty was to sell the product of the employer pharmaceuti
cal sales company.255
2. The 2010 Administrator’s Interpretation
In the 2010 Administrator’s Interpretation, the DOL strongly
posited that sales personnel within the mortgage loan industry were
not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime protections.256 In making
such a determination, the DOL again relied on the production/ad
strue the regulations broadly by holding the plaintiff salesperson exempt from FLSA
overtime protections. Id. at 338. The plaintiff’s work was analogous to a line worker
producing the product of the company for which he worked. Here, the company prod
uct was wireless telecommunication service. Id. at 336. Darveau “produced” the cell
service by selling the service to new customers. Contra id. at 338-39. His contribution
to the company did not advance the overall policies of the business. Contra id. at 339.
In addition, Darveau had no authority to make independent decisions, and therefore
did not perform his duties with discretion and independent judgment. Contra id. at 338
39. Had the Fourth Circuit construed regulations broadly, the court would have held
that Darveau qualified for overtime compensation. Interestingly, in support of its hold
ing, the court referenced the 2006 Wage and Hour Opinion letter, subsequently with
drawn by the DOL. Id. at 338. See supra Part III.A (discussing DOL withdrawal of
2006 Wage and Hour Opinion letter).
251. Cash, 508 F.3d 686.
252. Id. The court determined the plaintiff did not coordinate motorcycle order
ing or delivery, nor did he supervise any employees. Id. at 682. Although he occasion
ally attended management meetings, his role was merely to report to management
about the status of pick-up and delivery of the products sold—the motorcycles. Id.
“Often, after Cash provided these reports, [the manager] told him to leave the meet
ing.” Id. “In sum, Cash did not simply produce a product; he exercised independent
judgment as he engaged in the company’s business operations.” Id. at 686.
253. Smith, 593 F.3d at 285.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14; see supra
Part III.A.
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ministration dichotomy within the regulations.257 The Department
enunciated standards that apply to salespeople in general, in addi
tion to mortgage loan officers.258 The AI is entitled to controlling
deference, as the DOL’s interpretation of the regulations in the AI
is neither clearly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulations.259
To be sure, courts have struggled with the level of deference to
give agency-issued pronouncements such as Opinion Letters and
other interpretive materials.260 However, in United States v. Mead
Corp.,261 the Supreme Court enunciated a “category” of agency in
terpretations that should still be afforded controlling deference, de
spite the fact that the interpretation did not involve formal
rulemaking procedure such as notice and comment.262 In other
words, lack of formal rulemaking procedure was not dispositive of
controlling deference.263 If Congress intended to establish control
ling deference, courts should accord such deference.264
257. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14; see supra
Part III.A.
258. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14; see supra
Part III.A. The AI stated that an employee who had the primary duty of sales qualified
as a non-exempt production employee under the FLSA. In addition, the AI indicated
that in order to determine whether an employee’s primary duty was making sales,
“work performed incidental to sales should . . . also be considered sales work.” ADMIN
ISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14 (emphasis added).
259. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 390 (2008).
260. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587-88 (2000) (finding
opinion letters and guidance documents do not warrant controlling deference); Kilgore
v. Outback Steakhouses of Fla., Inc., 160 F.3d 294, 303 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a DOL
opinion letter unpersuasive). Contra Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S.
158, 171 (2007) (controlling deference given to an agency’s advisory memorandum);
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002) (determining that an agency’s informal
pronouncement was entitled to controlling deference regardless of the lack of notice
and comment rulemaking).
261. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
262. Id. at 230-31.
263. Id. at 231. The court’s position regarding notice and comment in Mead was
a shift in thinking. See, e.g., Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167-69 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that if an agency pronouncement is intended to be binding, notice and
comment is required).
264. Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 AD
MIN. L. REV. 771, 774 (2002). The Mead Court indicated that if “a plausible case
[could] be made that Congress would want . . . a delegation [of rulemaking authority] to
mean that agencies enjoy primary interpretational authority,” controlling deference
should apply to informal agency procedures. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 n.11 (quoting
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872
(2001)) (emphasis added). This position is not without its detractors, however. Profes
sor Levin argues “the congressional intent criterion would . . . give . . . lower courts
essentially no meaningful guidance.” Levin, supra at 774. Levin indicates a better
reading of Mead would interpret an agency’s action as binding, or having the force of
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The 2010 AI falls within the category of agency interpretations
deserving of controlling deference enunciated in the Mead case.
The DOL was given the express authority to administer and en
force the FLSA.265 In order to properly meet this directive, the
DOL must ensure the regulations are interpreted and applied cor
rectly. Indeed, the preamble to the 2004 regulations describes the
DOL’s “statutory duty to define and delimit the section 13(a)(1)
exemptions from time to time.”266 By issuing the AI, the DOL has
met this statutory directive by clarifying what it described to be a
“misleading assumption and selective and narrow analysis” enunci
ated in the 2006 Opinion Letter regarding mortgage industry sales
personnel.267 As the preamble to the regulations makes clear, their
purpose is to both restore overtime protections where they had
eroded over time, and to bring the FLSA in line with the changes to
the American workplace since the statute was enacted.268 Classify
ing mortgage salespeople as production workers entitled to over
time compensation as the AI did meets these goals of the amended
regulations. As such, the AI is entitled to controlling deference.
While this Note argues that the AI qualifies for controlling def
erence pursuant to the principles in Mead, the AI is still entitled to
persuasive deference if a court finds otherwise. The Mead holding
indicates that if a court determines that an agency’s interpretation is
not entitled to controlling deference, this does not place it “outside
the pale of any deference whatever.”269 The rule regarding control
ling deference did not displace, but merely supplemented the rule
from Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 270 Skidmore argued that agency in
terpretations are entitled to some deference.271 The reasons for
law, “if it alters or determines legal rights or obligations.” Id. at 775. Either reading of
Mead, however, would yield the same result. Because the Administrator’s Interpreta
tion does not answer a specific set of facts, it is intended to have binding effect on the
exempt status of a particular category of worker, here, salespeople.
265. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 204(a)-(b), 211(a), 216(c), 217 (2006).
266. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122 (internal quotations omitted).
267. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14, at 8.
268. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122. See supra Part III.A (discussing the
Final Rule). “By way of this rulemaking, the Department seeks to restore the overtime
protections intended by the FLSA . . . which have eroded over the decades. In addition,
workplace changes . . . and federal case law developments are not reflected in the cur
rent regulations.” Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122.
269. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001).
270. Skidmore et al. v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
271. Id. at 139 (“The weight of [the agency’s interpretation] will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.”).
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such deference are twofold. First, an agency such as the DOL is
considered the expert in the field addressed in the litigation.272 The
agency has access to “broader investigations and information” than
that which is available to courts interpreting a particular statute.273
Second, uniform application of the law is essential.274 It would
be fundamentally unfair for a mortgage broker, for example, work
ing for one bank to be ineligible for overtime compensation, while a
broker working for a different bank would be entitled to overtime
pay for identical job duties. At the same time, employers need a
uniform standard by which to classify salespeople in order to avoid
costly litigation.275 Deferring to the DOL’s position classifying
salespeople as production workers ensures the FLSA will be en
forced in a uniform manner.
The DOL itself reinforced this principle in the Preamble to the
2004 regulations, which indicated the regulations were being up
dated “to ensure that employees could understand their rights, em
ployers could understand their legal obligations, and the
Department could vigorously enforce the law.”276 Therefore, even
if the AI does not qualify for controlling deference, because it is
thorough in its analysis, well-reasoned, and consistent with the 2004
regulations, it is entitled to persuasive deference under
Skidmore.277

272. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
273. Id. (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139).
274. Id.
275. The current pharmaceutical industry litigation is an example of why a clear
standard for classifying sales personnel is warranted. As indicated earlier in this Note,
courts reviewing the exempt status of pharmaceutical sales representative have differed
in their classification of such workers. Without a clear standard, some pharmaceutical
companies have found themselves subject to large judgments, while others have
avoided liability. See In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011). Contra Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011).
276. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,122.
277. Some scholars suggest that even when courts apply persuasive Skidmore def
erence as opposed to controlling Chevron deference, courts are more likely to defer to
the agency’s interpretation. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search
of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1275 (2007). In a sample
of courts applying the Skidmore standard, deference to an agency was given approxi
mately sixty percent of the time. Id.
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3. The Amicus Brief on Behalf of the Plaintiffs in Novartis
The DOL’s amicus brief in the Novartis case278 is entitled to
controlling deference as it can be considered an interpretation of
the DOL’s own regulation.279 Since 1945, courts have held that an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations should be upheld “un
less it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”280
The Secretary of Labor enunciated this standard in the amicus
brief, stating “[t]his principle holds true whether the Secretary’s in
terpretation is found in a Preamble to a final rule published in the
Federal Register, an opinion letter or other interpretive materials,
or in a legal brief.”281
In Auer v. Robbins,282 the Supreme Court addressed the spe
cific issue of the level of deference due the DOL’s interpretation of
the regulatory test for exempt employees when the interpretation
came in the form of an amicus brief.283 The Court indicated that
the fact that the DOL’s interpretation was enunciated in an infor
mal agency pronouncement such as an amicus brief was of no con
sequence, as the brief was an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation.284
Petitioners complain that the Secretary’s interpretation comes to
us in the form of a legal brief; but that does not, in the circum
stances of this case, make it unworthy of deference . . . . There is
simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not re
flect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question.285

278. Amicus Brief, supra note 14. In the brief, the Secretary took the position
that the plaintiffs were not exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA as the
plaintiffs did not exercise discretion and independent judgment in carrying out the du
ties of their respective jobs. Id. at 7.
279. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008) (“Just as
[the courts] defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretations of the statute when it issues
regulations in the first instance, . . . the agency is entitled to further deference when it
adopts a reasonable interpretation of regulations it has put in force.”); Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
280. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Fed.
Express Corp., 552 U.S. at 397; Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
281. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 7 n.3.
282. Auer, 519 U.S. 452.
283. Id. at 461.
284. Id. at 462.
285. Id.
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The amicus brief is not “‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.’”286 In fact, in determining that the pharmaceutical
sales representatives did not exercise the requisite discretion and
independent judgment, the Secretary referenced specific sections of
the regulations.287 A reading of the regulations indicating that sales
reps did not exercise discretion and independent judgment in per
forming their job duties is simply an interpretation the Secretary is
entitled to make and courts are required to respect. Because the
DOL is entitled to deference in interpreting the FLSA, and the in
terpretation is neither erroneous nor inconsistent with the regula
tion, reviewing courts should defer to the holding in the amicus
brief and find that salespeople do not qualify for the administrative
exemption.
CONCLUSION
The FLSA is one of the most important worker protections in
America.288 The Act’s overtime protections have afforded benefits
to millions of employees throughout its history.289 In light of the
devastating effect the recent “Great Recession” has had on the
American worker, the protections of the FLSA are as relevant now
as they ever were.290 Due to the broad remedial nature of the stat
ute, any exemptions to the FLSA must be narrow and limited.291
The FLSA should therefore apply as though there is a presumption
against the exemptions.
Salespeople, as service personnel, are analogous to the line
worker or production workers in the original FLSA, and among the
category of worker the FLSA was established to protect.292 By
analogizing salespeople to production workers, salespeople gener
ally fall outside the boundaries of the administrative exemption.
The production/administration dichotomy has been a useful tool in
286. Id. at 461 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945)).
287. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 12 (referencing 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.202(e),
541.203(g)-(i) (2004)).
288. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 22,123.
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., Great Recession Transforms the Workplace, MSNBC.COM (Sept. 27,
2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33020534/ns/business-success_in_hard_times
(“The Great Recession has reshaped the American workplace and work force in ways
that will last years, if not longer . . . . Perhaps the most enduring change is the perma
nent loss of millions of jobs across the manufacturing, services and retail sectors.”).
291. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960).
292. ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1, supra note 14 (quoting Fi
nal Rule, supra note 27, at 22,141).
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extending the protections of the FLSA to the greatest number of
workers.
There are myriad benefits to evaluating sales personnel as pro
duction workers. First, it creates a uniform system of employee
classification. Such a classification promotes both just administra
tion of the law and efficiency within the legal system. A uniform
standard will enable employers to ensure similarly situated workers
are subject to the FLSA overtime pay provision in the same man
ner. At the same time, uniformity will prevent one employer not
required to pay overtime wages from having an unfair economic
advantage over another employer in the same industry who is re
quired. A uniform system minimizes misclassification of employ
ees. Employers will have guidance regarding which employees are
entitled to overtime, preventing the unfair surprise of a judgment
indicating large sums of overtime pay are due employees. Proper
classification will also reduce time consuming and costly litigation,
promoting efficiency in the judicial system.
Through recent regulation and informal interpretive rules, the
DOL has succeeded in both extending the protections of the FLSA
to the greatest number of workers and creating a uniform system of
employee classification. Classifying sales personnel as production
workers and applying the requirements of the FLSA overtime pro
vision as if there is a presumption against any exemptions furthers
these goals. The DOL is entitled to deference both because it has
been charged with the duty of enforcing the FLSA and it is inter
preting its own regulations. Reviewing courts should follow the
lead of both the DOL and the Second Circuit, and find, as a general
rule, salespeople do not qualify for the administrative exemption.
Like the production workers protected by the original iteration of
the FLSA, salespeople are entitled to protection under the Act and
should be paid overtime compensation.
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